As Europe faces increasing cyber threats, the Hungarian president’s continuing proposal to gain access to personal communications, allegedly to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM), has sparked a troubling debate. While framed as a necessity for protecting children, this argument serves as a Trojan horse to weaken encryption and erode personal privacy rights. This tactic is neither new nor unique to Hungary, but it raises significant concerns for privacy advocates, civil liberties groups, and tech experts. The argument threatens to undermine the very encryption protocols that safeguard sensitive data, both personal and corporate, across the continent and, potentially around the globe.
The erosion of encryption sets a precedent that can ripple through the entire EU and the world, endangering individual privacy and the security of governments and businesses alike. As Europe increasingly becomes a target for cyberattacks, the need for stronger encryption is evident. Phishing, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, smishing (SMS phishing), ransomware, and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are all on the rise. Weakening encryption standards would open the floodgates to these attacks, leaving the EU and related states more vulnerable than ever before.
Encryption as Europe’s Cybersecurity Foundation
Encryption is not just a tool for ensuring personal privacy; it is the backbone of modern cybersecurity. From individuals to corporations and governments, encryption is crucial in safeguarding everything from bank transactions to classified communications. Europe, as a global economic powerhouse, depends heavily on encrypted systems to protect its digital infrastructure.
The rise of phishing attacks, underscores the need for strong encryption protocols. Cybercriminals are growing more sophisticated, using techniques such as MITM attacks to intercept and manipulate communications in transit. Smishing attacks are also on the rise, targeting European citizens via SMS to steal sensitive information (we have other articles on Substack, and on our website, that show how PrivID can work with organisations to mitigate against these sorts of attacks and protect the critical data infrastructure). In such an environment, robust encryption is critical—not only for keeping individuals safe but for protecting corporate data and maintaining the integrity of government communications.
Weakening encryption protocols in any one EU member state opens the entire region to a cascading effect of vulnerabilities. Europe’s tightly integrated digital economy means that a breach in one country can quickly impact others. If encryption is undermined in Hungary, for instance, it could create weaknesses in systems that other EU nations rely on, potentially exposing the entire bloc to sophisticated cyberattacks.
The Flawed Logic of “Backdoors for Law Enforcement”
The Hungarian president’s argument, like many others across the globe, hinges on the belief that creating “backdoors” in encryption will help law enforcement access criminal communications. While this may sound logical in theory, it fails to account for a fundamental truth about encryption: backdoors cannot be selectively controlled. Once a backdoor exists, it becomes a target for exploitation by malicious actors, not just law enforcement.
For the European Union, allowing backdoors for even the most well-meaning purposes (CSAM) would be catastrophic. Criminal organisations, foreign adversaries, and rogue hackers would seek to exploit these backdoors, threatening not only the overall security of the various EU member states, also any of their partner states, but also the economic stability of the EU. The risk isn’t limited to isolated incidents; the integration of European financial, transportation, and healthcare systems means that an attack on one system could have widespread ramifications across the entire region.
Moreover, the EU has positioned itself as a global leader in data protection and privacy, most notably with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Weakening encryption would directly contradict the principles of GDPR, opening up personal data to increased risk of exposure. It would also undermine the EU’s role in setting global standards for data security and privacy.
A Dangerous Precedent for EU-Wide Surveillance
The introduction of backdoors in the EU sets a dangerous global precedent. If one member state can justify breaking encryption to gain access to personal communications, others may follow suit. This could lead to a domino effect, where privacy rights across the continent, and the world, are slowly eroded in the name of security.
For countries within the Schengen Area, where borderless travel enables the free movement of people and goods, weakening encryption in one member states exposes other states to the same risks. A cyberattack targeting one country’s systems could spread rapidly across borders, exploiting weaknesses created by reduced encryption standards. Given the high level of interconnectedness between EU states, compromising the security of one country’s data infrastructure could destabilise the security of the entire bloc.
Additionally, weakening encryption could put the EU at odds with its global partners. Countries like the United States and Canada have been closely monitoring how encryption laws evolve in Europe. If the EU were to allow backdoors, it could lead to increased pressure on these nations to follow suit (yes, we acknowledge that the US, in particular, has been using this argument for years), triggering a global wave of reduced privacy protections. The consequences would be dire, not only for personal privacy but for global cybersecurity as a whole.
The Consequences of Weaker Encryption for European Corporations
The EU is home to some of the world’s largest and most influential corporations, from banking giants to tech innovators. These businesses depend on encrypted communications to protect sensitive financial transactions, intellectual property, and trade secrets. Weakening encryption across the EU would significantly increase the risk of cyberattacks targeting these companies, which are already facing unprecedented levels of digital threats.
Ransomware attacks, in particular, have become a growing concern for [European] businesses. A weakened encryption system would provide cybercriminals with more opportunities to penetrate corporate networks and hold critical data hostage. The financial consequences of such attacks are staggering, with ransom demands reaching into the millions of euros and resulting in significant operational disruptions.
For multinational corporations that operate in multiple countries, a weakened encryption regime in one location, the EU, for example would mean that their data is only as secure as the weakest link in the chain. If the EU lowers its encryption standards, it could inadvertently expose European corporations, and their global partners, to cyber threats, regardless of location.
The EU Must Lead the Charge for Stronger Encryption
At a time when cyber threats are rapidly evolving, the European Union should be strengthening its encryption protocols, not weakening them. The EU has long been a champion of digital privacy, and allowing backdoors into encrypted systems would not only jeopardise its global leadership in this area but also increase vulnerabilities to cyberattacks across the continent.
The EU must resist pressure to weaken encryption in the name of CSAM or any other well-intentioned cause. Instead, it should invest in advanced technological solutions, like PrivID’s, that protect both children and privacy. Encryption is a vital part of Europe’s digital security architecture, and compromising it would open the door to more sophisticated cyberattacks, from phishing and smishing to ransomware and DDoS attacks.
In the face of rising cyber threats, the solution is clear: we must strengthen encryption, not erode it. Europe’s digital future depends on it.



Apple announced plans to introduce a system called CSAM Detection that would scan users' photos on their devices for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) before uploading them to iCloud. The plan was met with strong backlash from privacy advocates, cryptographers, and civil liberties groups, who argued that this system could be used as a backdoor to weaken encryption and invade user privacy. In response to the outcry, Apple delayed the rollout indefinitely in September 2021.
This event is often compared to earlier debates about encryption backdoors, such as the FBI's 2016 request for Apple to unlock an iPhone involved in the San Bernardino shooting case, which Apple also refused. Both instances reflect the tension between privacy and security in the digital age.
The EU’s ongoing debate over creating backdoors in encryption systems to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM) echoes such previous controversy involving Apple’s refusal to implement a system that would scan iPhones for similar material. In both cases, the requests are framed as necessary for protecting children, but privacy advocates argue they serve as Trojan horses for mass surveillance and data vulnerabilities.
In Apple’s case, the company refused to compromise the privacy of all its users by creating a system that could be exploited by malicious actors or governments for purposes beyond CSAM detection. Similarly, the argument in the EU that backdoors are needed for law enforcement, like the Hungarian president’s proposal, faces pushback for the same reason: once encryption is weakened, it becomes a target for exploitation by hackers, criminal organizations, and even foreign adversaries.
Both situations highlight the fundamental issue that encryption, once compromised, cannot be selectively weakened for only noble causes. In Apple's case, the company prioritized privacy and security, understanding that even a well-intentioned backdoor would threaten the integrity of its devices. The same logic applies to the EU: weakening encryption for one purpose could lead to cascading effects, opening the door to increased cyberattacks, especially in an environment where cyber threats are already on the rise.
Ultimately, both scenarios revolve around a critical balance between security and privacy. While protecting children is paramount, the risks of undermining encryption and creating backdoors are profound, threatening both personal privacy and broader digital security. Both Apple and EU privacy advocates argue for maintaining strong encryption as a safeguard against these threats.